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BOYS WILL BE GIRLS: SEX REASSIGNMENT  
SURGERY AND THE ETHICS OF STATE FUNDING
MEGAN LESLIE†
ABSTRACT
This paper was developed as a result of the authorʼ’s involvement with 
the Nova Scotia Rainbow Action Project in Halifax, Nova Scotia, who 
are planning an action whereby a member of the group will submit a 
complaint of discrimination to the provincial Human Rights Commis-
sion, contrary to the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, on the ground of 
sex.	
     The complaint will be based on a memberʼ’s denial of Nova Sco-
tia Medical Services Insurance coverage for sex reassignment surgery, 
which is prohibited in Nova Scotia. This paper outlines the players and 
decision-making involved in determining whether or not sex reassign-
ment surgery is funded by the state and discusses feminist theories of 
gender that make problematic the need for sex reassignment surgery, 
specifically the social construction, authenticity and transgression of 
gender.  The author also considers both the medical diagnosis of Gen-
der Identity Disorder and the problems with sex reassignment surgery 
as a treatment for this disorder.  In conclusion, through a feminist ethics 
analysis of the different arguments for and against sex reassignment 
surgery, the author concludes that there is a need for the surgery to 
be state-funded, but that deconstructing the two-gender system could 
eliminate this need in the future.  
† The author is a third year student at Dalhousie Law School and a founding member of the 
Social Activist Law Student Association (SALSA).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nova Scotia Rainbow Action Project (NSRAP) is a group in Halifax, 
Nova Scotia, that acts as a voice for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgen-
dered Nova Scotians.1  In the spring of 2004, NSRAP intends to submit 
a complaint to the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission of discrimi-
nation on the grounds of sex, contrary to paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Nova 
Scotia Human Rights Act.	
    2 The complaint will be based on a denial of 
Nova Scotia Medical Services Insurance (MSI) coverage for sex reas-
signment surgery (SRC) to a member of NSRAP. The Nova Scotia Phy-
sicianʼ’s Manual, a document that itemizes procedures insured by MSI, 
specifically prohibits SRC.3
The complaint by NSRAP is a deliberate tactic to use the law as a tool 
for social change. If the denial of SRC is found to be discrimination on 
the basis of sex, MSI could be ordered to cease applying the policy in the 
Physicianʼ’s Manual, and transsexuals in Nova Scotia would be given 
access to treatment and surgery to bring their physical gender in line 
with their psychological gender. 
In this paper I outline the players and decision-making involved in 
determining whether or not sex reassignment surgery is funded by the 
state. I then discuss feminist theories of gender that problematize the 
need for sex reassignment surgery, specifically the social construction 
of gender, performativity of gender, authenticity of gender and trans-
gression of gender. I also consider both the medical diagnosis of Gender 
Identity Disorder and the problems with SRC as a treatment for this dis-
order. Finally, through a feminist ethics analysis of the different argu-
ments for and against sex reassignment surgery, I conclude that while 
the experience of transsexuals proves there is a need for state-funded 
1 It is generally accepted that transgender is an umbrella term that includes any gender variant, 
such as drag kings and queens, transvestites and transsexuals. Transsexuals are people who be-
lieve they are the opposite gender that would traditionally be linked to their birth sex, and seek 
to become that sex by hormonal therapy or sex reassignment surgery to realign their physical 
body with their mental gender. I will refer to male to female transsexuals as transsexual women, 
and female to male transsexuals as transsexual men. A personʼ’s sex (i.e. genetic makeup, being 
different from gender), their self awareness and behaviour experienced and labeled as male or 
female. Sex and gender are again different from sexual orientation, which is the gender prefer-
ence of oneʼ’s sexual attraction.
2 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 5(1).
3 Nova Scotia Medical Services Insurance, Physicianʼ’s Manual, looseleaf (Halifax, N.S.: s.n., 
197?–) [the Manual].
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SRC today, we need to work to eliminate the two-gender system which 
will ultimately reduce, if not eliminate, the need for SRC in the future. 
II. INSURED SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY EXPLAINED
1. The Legislators
While health care falls under provincial jurisdiction pursuant to section 
92 of the Constitution,4 health care resource allocation involves both the 
federal and provincial governments. The Canada Health Act5 establish-
es the criteria and conditions that must be met by the provinces before 
receiving payment for health services from the federal government.6 
The Act lists a set of criteria the provinces must meet in order to 
receive a full cash contribution, and specifically requires that provinces 
fund all insured services provided by hospitals and medical practition-
ers.7 The Act defines “hospital services” as:
…any of the following services provided to in-patients or out-
patients at a hospital, if the services are medically necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining health, preventing disease or diagnosing or 
treating an injury, illness or disability…8
The job of determining what is “medically necessary” is left to the prov-
inces. Each province has set up a system whereby the provincial govern-
ments and medical associations negotiate the services to be included in 
the schedule of fees that allows physicians to be paid for their work.9 
The allocation of decision making to the provinces means insured health 
services differ from province to province, and new procedures and treat-
ments are added to the list of health services if and when a province 
decides to do so. 
Sex reassignment surgery is one service that has been added to the 
list of insured services in some provinces but not in others. In Nova 
4 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
5 R.S.C. 1985, c. 6 [the Act].
6 Ibid. s. 3.
7 Ibid. s. 9.
8 Ibid. s. 2 [emphasis added].
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Scotia, some peripheral medical treatments involved in sex reassign-
ment, like hormone treatment, are covered; however, surgery is explic-
itly deemed a non-insured procedure. SRC is an insured procedure only 
in Manitoba, Alberta, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan.
Medical necessity is vaguely defined in the Physicianʼ’s Manual pub-
lished by Nova Scotia Medical Services Insurance.10 The Manualʼ’s pre-
amble defines medical necessity as “those services provided by a physi-
cian to a patient with the intent to diagnose or treat physical or mental 
disease or dysfunction….” However, it goes on to state that services ex-
plicitly deemed non-insured remain uninsured “regardless of individual 
judgments regarding their medical necessity.” This means that in Nova 
Scotia an individual doctor has no right to determine that SRC is medi-
cally necessary for an individual patient.11 
2. The Doctors
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), 
published by the American Psychiatric Association, is the accepted au-
thority for the classification and diagnosis of mental disorders in North 
America.12 Gender Identity Disorder (GID) is listed as a mental disor-
der that manifests in two ways: Gender Identity Disorder in Children, 
and Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents or Adults (302.6 and 
302.85).13 
9 William Lahey, “Overview of the Canadian Health Care System” in Dental Law in Canada 
[forthcoming in 2004].
10 Supra note 3.
11 Part 2.1 of the Manualʼ’s Preamble provides:
Medically necessary services may be defined as those services provided by a physician to a 
patient with the intent to diagnose or treat physical or mental disease or dysfunction, as well as 
those services generally accepted as promoting health through prevention of disease or dysfunc-
tion.
The provision of a service listed in the Schedule of Benefits does not ensure payment by Medi-
cal Services Insurance. Services provided in circumstances where they were not medically nec-
essary are not insured. For the purpose of this Preamble, Medical services, which are explicitly 
deemed to be non-insured under the Health Services and Insurance Act or its Regulations, re-
main uninsured regardless of individual judgments regarding their medical necessity.
12 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) [DSM-IV].
13 Ibid. at 538.
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While the DSM-IV defines mental illness in North America, the 
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association is a pro-
fessional organization dedicated to the understanding and treatment of 
gender identity disorders. The Harry Benjamin Association produces 
the Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders14 as a professional 
consensus about the “psychiatric, psychological, medical, and surgical 
management of gender identity disorders.”15 The Standards of Care are 
guidelines that provide flexible directions for the treatment of persons 
with GID, and specifically require a diagnosis of GID using the DSM-IV 
criteria before treatment for the disorder can begin. One of the treat-
ments listed is sex reassignment surgery.16
If Gender Identity Disorder is a mental disorder according to the 
DSM-IV, and SRC is one treatment for GID, then it stands to reason that 
in some cases SRC would be medically necessary to treat this mental 
disorder. Given the Nova Scotia government determines medical neces-
sity based upon the physicianʼ’s intent to “diagnose or treat physical or 
mental disease or dysfunction,” it should follow, barring any legislative 
policy decisions, that sex reassignment surgery is a service that should 
be insured. However, this is not the case. Because of the structure of the 
system for health care resource allocation, “medically necessary” is ac-
tually equivalent to “insured” and has no independent meaning outside 
of this legislative meaning.
3. The Policy Makers
Health care resource allocation is an important consideration to factor 
into funding of SRC. In his analysis of the just use of health care resourc-
es (in this case, with respect to in vitro fertilization), Leonard J. Weber 
14 Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, Standards of Care for Gender 
Identity Disorders, Sixth Version, February, 2001, online: The Harry Benjamin International 
Gender Dysphoria Association, Inc. <http://www.hbigda.org/socv6.pdf> [Standards of Care].
15 Ibid. at 1.
16 The Standards of Care provide that: Sex Reassignment is Effective and Medically Indicated 
in Severe GID. In persons diagnosed with transsexualism or profound GID, sex reassignment 
surgery, along with hormone therapy and real life experience, is a treatment that has proven to 
be effective. Such a therapeutic regimen, when prescribed or recommended by qualified practi-
tioners, is medically indicated and medically necessary. Sex reassignment is not “experimental,” 
“investigational,” “elective,” “cosmetic,” or optional in any meaningful sense. It constitutes 
very effective and appropriate treatment for transsexualism or profound GID. Ibid. at 18.
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considers principles of just allocation. One of his suggestions is to es-
tablish principles to assist in the identification of what priority a particu-
lar treatment should have in the allocation of health resources.17 Weber 
lists five principles to help identify priority treatments. They are:
1. Treatment that, if successful, provides a significant benefit 
to the patient takes priority over treatment that, if successful, 
provides only marginal benefit.
2. A treatment that can benefit many persons generally takes 
priority over a treatment that can benefit only a few.
3. A treatment that is less expensive generally takes priority over 
a treatment that is more expensive.
4. Allocation decisions should not be made on the basis of who 


































If we consider Weberʼ’s priority principles as they impact resource allo-
cation arguments for SRC, there is a fairly straightforward argument for 
insured surgery. First, SRC provides a significant benefit to the patient, 
offering “lasting personal comfort with the gendered self (that maximiz-
es) overall psychological well-being and self-fulfillment.”19 Transsexual 
activists have noted that without treatment options many transsexuals 
commit suicide, are murdered, or receive inadequate medical care as 
a result of their transsexualism: the preservation of life is inarguably a 
significant benefit to a transsexual patient.20 Second, transsexuals as a 
group are marginalized, and among the least powerful in Canadian soci-
ety; special priority must be given to the treatments of Gender Identity 
Disorder. Surgery can be a medically necessary treatment for GID, and it 
is just to allocate health care resources to sex reassignment surgery.
17 Leonard J. Weber, “In Vitro Fertilization and the Just Use of Health Care Resources” in James 
M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder, eds., Reproduction, Technology and Rights (Totowa, N.J.: 
Humana Press, 1996) at 82.
18 Ibid. at 82-83.
19 Standards of Care, supra note 14 at 1.
20 See e.g. “Remembering Our Dead,” online: GenderOrg Homepage <http://www.gender.org/
remember/>.
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4. The Judges
In 2003, the Federal Court of Canada dealt with the issue of essential 
health care and sex reassignment surgery in the context of a male to 
female transsexual serving a life sentence for murder.21 A transsexual 
woman initiated a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and disability. Her 
complaint was made against the Correctional Service of Canadaʼ’s (CSC) 
policies regarding transsexual inmates, namely CSCʼ’s policy on place-
ment of pre-operative transsexual inmates and their prohibition of sex 
reassignment surgery for incarcerated individuals. With regard to the 
prohibition on surgery, CSCʼ’s policy at the time was that sex reassign-
ment surgery was not to be considered during the inmateʼ’s incarcera-
tion.22
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act23 mandates that every 
inmate must be provided with essential health care. The definition of 
essential health care in section 87(1) of CSCʼ’s policies is:
Inmates shall have access to screening referral and treatment services. 
Essential services shall include […] mental health care provided in 
response to disturbances of thought, mood, perception, orientation 
or memory that significantly impairs judgement, behaviour, the 
capacity to recognize reality or the ability to meet the ordinary 
demands of life. This includes the provision of both acute and long-
term mental health care services…24
The Human Rights Tribunal found that for some people sex reassign-
ment surgery constituted a legitimate, medically recognized treatment 
for transsexualism. Further, the Tribunal found that in some cases SRC 
could be essential. On judicial review, Layden-Stevenson J. agreed with 
the Tribunal and found that SRC could be an essential health service. She 
wrote:
Essential health care, pursuant to CCRA (subsection 86(1)), is 
provided to inmates. The provision is mandatory. If sex reassignment 
surgery is determined to be essential, subsection 86(1) applies.
21 Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), 2003 FCT 89, 
[2003] F.C.J. No. 117 (QL: FCJ) [AG v. CHRC].
22 Ibid. at para. 3.
23 S.C. 1992, c. 20.
24 AG v. CHRC, supra note 21 at para. 8.
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[...] I do not take issue with the conclusion that the role of the 
court is limited when reviewing policy-based determinations by 
officials who are accountable for public funds. However, the right 
of government to allocate resources as it sees fit is not unlimited. 
“It must be exercised according to law. The governmentʼ’s right to 
allocate resources cannot override a statute such as the Canadian 
Human Rights Act”…	
    25
Not only did Layden-Stevenson J. find that SRC was an essential health 
service, but she also found that Correctional Services Canada was re-
quired to pay for the surgery. She relied on the Harry Benjamin Stand-
ards of Care assertion that sex reassignment surgery can be medically 
necessary as well as expert evidence that untreated transsexualism can 
lead to individuals suffering from disabling torment.26 In light of this 
decision, the answer to the question of whether or not MSI should fund 
sex assignment surgery seems to be a straightforward “yes.” 
III. THE GENDER PROBLEM
In their groundbreaking 1978 book Gender: An Ethnomedical Approach, 
anthropologists Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna introduced the 
concept of looking at gender as a social construct.27 Kessler and McK-
enna argue that gender identity refers to an individualʼ’s own feelings 
about whether he or she is a man or woman (girl or boy), and that gender 
identity is a self-attribution of gender. They point out that:
…by what criteria a person might classify someone as being either 
male or female, the answers appear to be so self-evident as to make the 
question trivial. But consider a list of items that differentiate females 
from males. There are none that always and without exception are 
true of only one gender. No behavioural characteristic (e.g., crying 
or physical aggression) is always present or never present for one 
gender. Neither can physical characteristics—either visible (e.g., 
beards), unexposed (e.g., genitals), or normally unexamined (e.g., 
gonads)—always differentiate the genders.28
25 Ibid. paras. 51-52.
26 Ibid. para. 41.
27 Suzanne J. Kessler & Wendy McKenna, Gender: An Ethnomedical Approach (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1978) [Gender].
28 Ibid. at 8.
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Kessler and McKenna speak of “gender attribution” as the moment 
when we decide someone is male or female.29 When we are born we are 
attributed gender when the doctor looks at our genitals; save for cases 
of ambiguous genitalia,30 this is a fairly simple process. 
However, Kessler and McKenna question the rigid and dichotomous 
nature of gender attribution, and highlight the fact that ambiguous cases 
bring to light the value society ascribes to the bipartite gender attribu-
tion process.31 They go on to consider the gender attribution process 
throughout oneʼ’s life, and argue that people make gender attributions—
decisions about whether someone is male or female— every time they 
meet someone new. When we subconsciously look for signs of breasts 
to identify women (although not all women have noticeable breasts and 
not all men lack breasts), signs of a beard to identify men (although not 
all men have a noticeable beard and not all women lack beards), and a 
whole range of other gender signifiers, we are simply “determining,” for 
the moment, whether a person is either male or female. But more than 
just a sweeping inspection to determine gender, Kessler and McKenna 
argue that “…gender attribution forms the foundation for understand-
ing other components of gender, such as gender role (behaving like a 
female or male) and gender identity (feeling like a female or male).”32 
If gender is socially constructed, it should follow that one could 
learn and adopt social signifiers of the opposite sex (e.g. “masculine” 
dress or “feminine” hand gestures). Combined with the ability to medi-
cally alter oneʼ’s body to possess biological signifiers of the opposite sex 
(e.g. “male” Adamʼ’s apple or “female” breasts), it becomes possible to 
achieve a state of “being” the opposite gender. Sociologist Myra J. Hird 
found that in the 1990ʼ’s a “distinct set of transsexual narratives began to 
argue that if gender can be learned then ʻ‘womanhoodʼ’ (and ʻ‘manhoodʼ’) 
29 Ibid. at 2.
30 In her book Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1998) at 4, historian Alice Dreger discusses the history of hermpahrodism. She writes 
that “some people—more than is generally assumed—are born with an anatomical conforma-
tion different from ʻ‘standardʼ’ male or female bodies. Their unusual anatomies can result in con-
fusion and disagreement about whether they should be considered female or male or something 
else. These people have for centuries been labeled as ʻ‘hermaphroditesʼ’…”
31 Gender, supra note 27 at 3.
32 Gender, supra note 27 at 2 [emphasis in original].
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is available to anyone with the capacity to learn.”33 Thus, transsexual-
ism provides us with evidence that gender is an expression of sex using 
signifiers which have been both created and approved by society.
Adding to Kessler and McKennaʼ’s concept that gender attribution 
is the building block for understanding other components of gender is 
Judith Butlerʼ’s notion of the performativity of gender.	
    34 Performativity 
rests on the argument that gender is constructed, and that we will never 
know our sex outside of our gender because we perform our gender 
according to the acts, gestures, and desires that are the organizing prin-
ciples of identity. At birth, weʼ’re assigned a gender according to that 
sex. As we grow up we adopt social signifiers of gender. Women wear 
makeup, men keep their hair and nails short, women sit with their legs 
crossed and men undo their jackets when they sit down. There are a 
myriad of social signifiers, from dress to mannerisms, which we perform 
to display our sex, through gender, when our biological sex is covered. 
Butler takes this idea one step further and asks what, if anything, is left 
of “sex” once it has assumed its social character of gender? If gender is 
socially constructed by what we assume of sex, then sex doesnʼ’t acquire 
social meaning but instead is replaced by gender.35 Butler argues that 
since gender is the social signifier of sex, that sex is, in effect, gender. 
This circular sex/gender theory is supported by Kessler and McKen-
naʼ’s earlier work. They write, “[T]he reality of gender is proved by the 
genital which is attributed and at the same time the attributed genital 
only has meaning through the socially shared construction of gender 
attribution.”36 Hird refers to the signifiers we rely on to make gender 
attributions as “cultural genitals.”37 Butler goes so far as to suggest that 
all we have are “cultural genitals”: that if there is no access to “sex” 
but through these signifiers then “sex” itself is something of a fiction or 
fantasy.38
33 Myra J. Hird, “For a Sociology of Transsexualism” (August 2002) 36:3 Sociology 577 at 584 
[Sociology].
34 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 
1990) at 136.
35 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 
1993) at 4 [Bodies That Matter].
36 Gender, supra note 27 at 8.
37 Sociology, supra note 33 at 588.
38 Sociology, supra note 33 at 5.
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All these overlapping theories hinge on sex and gender as mutable 
and socially constructed, but, more importantly, they call into question 
the value of SRC. If “becoming” the opposite sex is achievable through 
performance, then genital reconstruction through sex reassignment sur-
gery should be unnecessary—arguably one could rely on constructing 
“cultural genitals” to effect a successful sex reassignment. 
But what if performativity is linked to biology and the body? Ethi-
cist Janice Raymondʼ’s 1979 book The Transsexual Empire was one of 
the first books to challenge the medical/psychiatric concept of trans-
sexualism and SRC as the cure, and instead questions the concept of gen-
der itself.39 But Raymond still insists on genderʼ’s link to biology. She 
repeatedly references the feminization of a man or the masculinization 
of a woman when she discusses sex reassignment surgery and “becom-
ing” the other sex. She agrees that masculinity and femininity are social 
constructs and stereotypes of behaviour that are imagined in a particular 
body, but argues these stereotypes, “…in the case of the transsexual, 
have nothing to do with a male or female body. Thus the male-to-con-
structed-female goes from one stereotype to the other.”40 She points out 
that SRC is a surgical construction to bring a personʼ’s body in line with 
the stereotyped behaviour. Nonetheless, she distinguishes masculinity 
and femininity from “male” and “female.” The former are socially and 
surgically constructed; the latter are governed by biology and the vast 
history surrounding that biology.41 
Raymond does not see gender as immutable, but at the same time 
she is unwilling to accept that a transsexual can change his or her sex. 
While she does not believe that chromosomal sex defines gender, she 
uses Kessler and McKenna as a jumping off point to argue that chromo-
somal sex shapes gender. She writes that in the case of women, female 
biology has shaped female history, including:
…the history of menstruation, the history of pregnancy or the 
capacity to become pregnant, the history of childbirth and abortion, 
the history of certain bodily cycles and life changes, and the history 
of female subordination in a male-dominant society.42 
39 Janice Raymond, The Transsexual Empire: The Making of the She-Male (New York: Teach-
erʼ’s College Press, 1994) [Transsexual Empire].
40 Ibid. at 3.
41 Ibid. at 4.
42 Ibid. at 7.
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It is this link to biology that centres Raymondʼ’s arguments in the “au-
thenticity” of gender. One writer on transsexualism notes:
There is hardly a more dramatic instance of contemporary professional 
authority than so-called ʻ‘sex change surgery.ʼ’ Physicians perform 
cosmetic surgery yet certify that their patients have undergone a 
change in sex.43
However, most in the medical community do not view SRC as changing 
a personʼ’s sex or gender,44 because society, which includes the medi-
cal community, assumes that sex exists as a measurable and immutable 
trait. Raymond deconstructs that assumption and roots it in history and 
experience, while at the same time coming to a similar conclusion about 
sex and the authenticity of sex.
Raymond and Butler have incompatible views on the topic of “sex”. 
Raymond roots part of how we imagine sex in biological and historical 
realities, while Butler reasons that the performativity of gender replaces 
sex and renders those realities obsolete categorizations. Nonetheless, 
both leave us wondering about the priority of sex reassignment surgery. 
If we accept that gender is performance, then there is no need to physi-
cally change oneʼ’s genitalia in order to “become” the other sex. Con-
versely, if Raymond is correct in her linkage of sex to biology, then 
no amount of surgery will transform transsexuals into the other sex. In 
fact, Raymond not only questions the value of SRC but argues against 
it; she believes that SRC and transsexualism undercut the movement “to 
eradicate sex-role stereotyping and oppression in this culture. Instead it 
fosters institutional bases of sexism under the guise of therapy.”45
Looking back to Weberʼ’s principles of health resource allocation, 
one must question the “significant benefit” achieved by SRC in light of 
these theories. Is there a “significant benefit” if sex reassignment can 
be achieved without surgery, or if sex reassignment can never happen, 
even with surgery? Surely a successful surgery could maximize psycho-
logical well-being and self-fulfillment, but how can a benefit be justified 
43 Dwight D. Billings & Thomas Urban, “The Socio-Medical Construction of Transsexualism: 
An Interpretation and Critique” in Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross-dressing and Sex-
changing, Richard Ekins & Dave King, eds., (New York: Routledge, 1996) at 99 [Construction 
of Transsexualism].
44 Sociology, supra note 33 at 582.
45 Transsexual Empire, supra note 39 at 5.
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46 Sociology, supra note 33 at 586.
47 Bodies That Matter, supra note 35 at 230.
48 Kate Borenstein, Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women and the Rest of Us (New York: Routledge, 
1994) [Gender Outlaw].
49 Ibid. at 123.
when the treatment is comparable to a placebo? If these theories are cor-
rect, other treatments for Gender Identity Disorder need to be prioritized 
over SRC—if SRC should be given a priority at all.
Another concept that complicates support of SRC is the proposi-
tion of gender transgression: “playing” with notions of gender with the 
intended effect of rendering the two-gender system obsolete. The as-
sumed characteristic of gender in our discussion thus far is that there are 
only two sexes (male/female) and two genders (masculine/feminine). 
Sex and gender are generally accepted as contemporaneous states. Both 
male and female sexes are ordered by a set of stereotypes/signifiers that 
are imagined as attributable to a particular body. Transsexuals render 
these signifiers visible,46 offering us a chance to both question and play 
with them. Butler considers drag, dressing in the clothing appropriate 
for the opposite sex for the purpose of performing, to be one example 
of the transgression of gender. Using Foucaultʼ’s language of power and 
resistance, she writes that sometimes:
…the transferability of a gender ideal or gender norm calls into 
question the abjecting power that it sustains. For an occupation or 
reterritorialization of a term that has been used to abject a population 
can become the site of resistance, the possibility of an enabling 
social and political resignification.47
Similarly, transsexual Kate Borenstein argues that transsexuals arenʼ’t 
men or women, not because they are “inauthentic,” but because trans-
sexuals, by their very existence, radically deconstruct sex and gender.48 
She believes that gender is not consensual:
Weʼ’re born: a doctor assigns us a gender. Itʼ’s documented by the 
state, enforced by the legal profession, sanctified by the church, and 
itʼ’s bought and sold by the media. We have no say in our gender—
weʼ’re not allowed to question it, play with it, work it out with our 
friends, lovers or family.49
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Borenstein calls for people to question gender, to subvert it, deconstruct, 
it and reconstruct it. Through the transgression of gender, the lines of 
gender categories will blur and people will be free to construct their 
own gender (or not), in the way that they see fit. Being a drag king or 
queen, a crossdresser, transgendered, butch or femme, a transvestite, 
two-spirited, or gender variant in any other way pushes the boundaries 
of societyʼ’s definition of male/masculine and female/feminine as much 
as transsexuality. Transgression can be an important step in challenging 
the two-gender system.
However, it is difficult to argue that all forms of transsexualism are 
subversive. Raymond identifies a transgression as being hyper-conform-
ity to sex-roles.50 It is hard to avoid the fact that hormones and surgery 
reify hegemonic gender norms.51 Especially in the context of the Stand-
ard of Careʼ’s requirement of “passing,” transsexuals are expected to be 
ultra-masculine or ultra-feminine, reproducing the extreme end of either 
gender. Anticipating the flaws in her argument for transgression, Butler 
calls into question “…whether parodying the dominant norms is enough 
to displace them; indeed, whether the denaturalization of gender cannot 
be the very vehicle for a reconsolidation of hegemonic norms.”52 
Sex reassignment surgery both confirms and legitimizes sex and 
gender norms. In fact, part of the reason that SRC has been supported 
by mainstream medicine may be because it is an example of the binary 
gender system prevailing even in the face of perversion, mental dys-
function, and sickness: despite the transsexualʼ’s illness, he or she simply 
wants to become the other gender. Transsexualism is easy to under-
stand, support and cure so long as the two-gender system is upheld. It is 
when true gender variance is proposed, like introducing a third gender 
category that transgression becomes more like the vehicle of liberation 
it has been proposed to be.
50 Transsexual Empire, supra note 39 at 216.
51 Sociology, supra note 33 at 590.
52 Bodies That Matter, supra note 35 at 125.
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IV. THE MEDICAL PROBLEM
Michel Foucault, in The History of Sexuality, describes the “medicaliza-
tion of the sexually peculiar” as a nineteenth century phenomenon—one 
which was both an effect and an instrument of the power of health and 
pathology.53 This medicalization was focused on biological anatomy as 
the centre of truth; the medical scientist was a discoverer of truth, and 
through his scientific explorations he alone could solve the problems 
that the peculiar posed. Hird argues that the history of transsexualism 
is a history of pathology, and points out that the word “transsexual” it-
self is a psychological and medical classification54—a specific situation 
where the “truth” of anatomy did not match the “truth” in a patientʼ’s 
mind.  
While the history of transsexualism is a story that closely parallels, 
and oftentimes overlaps with, the histories of homosexuality and her-
maphrodism,55 transsexualism does have its own unique medical and 
social history. There is evidence of hormone therapy given to male trans-
sexuals to stimulate breast development as early as the 1920ʼ’s, but any 
gender variant people who sought medical treatment were labelled as 
“transvestites” and treated as isolated cases. The transsexual “emerged” 
in the early 1950ʼ’s with the widely publicized operation on Christine 
Jorgensen in Denmark and was soon followed by the coining of the term 
“transsexual” by Dr. Harry Benjamin.56 Prior to this time, transsexual-
ism had been dismissed as a perversion; with the operation on Chris-
tine Jorgensen, there emerged a medical “cure”. Sex change advocates 
worked to legitimize surgical treatment by constructing theories about 
transsexualism that stressed the non-psychopathic nature of the illness 
and by rationalizing diagnostic and treatment strategies.57 Transsexual-
ism was further medicalized and legitimized when it received the new 
53 (New York: Vintage Books, 1990) at 44.
54 Sociology, supra note 33 at 579.
55 For a history of hermaphrodism, see, for example, Alice Dregerʼ’s book Hermaphrodism and 
the Medical Invention of Sex, supra note 30. For a history of homosexuality see, for example, 
Jeffery Weeks, Against Nature: Essays on History, Sexuality, Identity (London: Rivers Oram, 
1991). 
56 For a history of transsexualism see, for example, “Gender Blending,” infra note 58 (social 
history), and Leslie M. Lothstein, “Sex Reassignment Surgery: Historical, Bioethical, and Theo-
retical Issues” (1982) 139:4 Am J Psychiatry 417 [Sex Reassignment Surgery].
57 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 39 at 104.
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name of “gender dysphoria” in the 1970ʼ’s, a term that moved away from 
the person and toward the condition; thus the term named a disease that 
was to be the property of the medical profession.58
In 1980, Gender Identity Disorder appeared in the third edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and it is still 
included in the Manualʼ’s most recent fourth edition.59 The diagnostic 
criteria for adults and adolescents are:
A. A strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a 
desire for any perceived cultural advantages of being the other 
sex). In adolescents and adults, the disturbance is manifested by 
symptoms such as a stated desire to be the other sex, frequent 
passing as the other sex, desire to live or be treated as the other 
sex, or the conviction that he or she has the typical feelings and 
reactions of the other sex.
B. Persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of 
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. In adolescents 
and adults, the disturbance is manifested by symptoms such as 
preoccupation with getting rid of primary and secondary sex 
characteristics (e.g., request for hormones, surgery, or other 
procedures to physically alter sexual characteristics to simulate 
the other sex) or belief that he or she was born the wrong sex.
C. The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex 
condition.
D. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.60
Forms of illness are more than just biological disease; they are also 
metaphors, and possess both moral and social meaning.61 If we consider 
the social meaning of gender implicit in the DSM-IVʼ’s criteria for trans-
sexuality, it is apparent that there are only two genders, and that both 
genders are tangible, achievable things: gender is something you are, 
58 Dave King, “Gender Blending: Medical Perspectives and Technology” in Blending Genders: 
Social Aspects of Cross-dressing and Sex-changing, Richard Ekins & Dave King, eds., (New 
York: Routledge, 1996) at 96.
59 Interestingly, “homosexuality” as a disorder was removed from the second edition in 1973.
60 DSM-IV, supra note 12 at 538.
61 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 43 at 112.
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62 Gender, supra note 27 at 58.
63 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 43 at 110.
64 DSM-IV, supra note 12 at 537.
65 Katherine K. Wilson, “Gender as Illness: Issues of Psychiatric Classification,” online: <http:
www.transgender.org/tg/gidr/kwictl97.html> at subheading “Blaming the Victim.”
you can be, and that you can identify. For example, “frequent passing 
as the other sex” relies on the transsexualʼ’s interpretation (or societyʼ’s 
interpretation) of the characteristics of a particular sex; diagnosing the 
disorder depends on the subjectʼ’s success at “passing”—success that 
relies on the medical practitionerʼ’s interpretation of what it means to 
be a man or woman, and whether or not the transsexualʼ’s performance 
was good enough. According to the Manual, male and female charac-
teristics are quantifiable, and although the specifics of what constitutes 
“typical feelings and reactions of the other sex” arenʼ’t listed, it is clear 
that they are expected to be both known and understood by patient and 
doctor. Kessler and McKenna write about one doctor who used his own 
sexual attraction to a patient as a gauge for determining the “validity” 
of his patientʼ’s claim of transsexuality.62 In more recent writing, Dwight 
Billings and Thomas Urban describe a doctorʼ’s evaluation methods to 
include antagonizing his genetic male patients to the point where they 
lash out and he could properly assess their behaviour: gays get aggres-
sive, “girls” cry.63
Even if we disregard these extreme examples and dismiss them 
as unfortunate worst-case scenarios, it is still clear that the diagnostic 
criteria still rely on sex stereotyping and views gender strictly through 
a medical lens. In the introduction to the section on GID, the DSM-IV 
states, “Gender Identity Disorder can be distinguished from simple non-
conformity to stereo-typical sex role behaviour by the extent and perva-
siveness of the cross-gender wishes, interests and activities.”64 Accord-
ing to the DSM-IV, deviation from societyʼ’s biologically determined sex 
roles is acceptable, so long as you donʼ’t go too far. The criteria also 
focus on symptoms that the illness can manifest, namely, significant 
distress or impairment with regards to functioning in society. 
Transgendered people do suffer distress and impairment in society 
—from “intolerance, discrimination, violence, undeserved shame, and 
denial of personal freedoms that ordinary men and women take for 
granted.”65 The DSM-IV criteria for GID are so ambiguous and rely on 
such negative and sexist stereotypes that the simple first step of diag-
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nosis calls into question the ethics of any treatment available for GID 
and begs the question: is the diagnosis even right? Leslie Lothstein, in 
the American Journal of Psychiatry, found that clinicians who advocate 
SRC as a legitimate treatment see it as a cure, and believe that psycho-
therapy is useless for patients with GID. Doctors who view SRC as an 
illegitimate treatment point to the “…complex psychological, medical, 
legal, bioethical and political issues that are neglected or bypassed by 
sex reassignment surgery procedures. They argue that sex reassignment 
surgery leads to mistreatment and mismanagement of the gender dys-
phoric patient.”66 Lothstein cites several studies where patients were sat-
isfied with the procedure and there is evidence of positive life changes;67 
however, Billings and Urban point out that patients can “ill afford to be 
critical of such a profound alteration as genital amputation.”68
Once a person has been diagnosed with GID, the patient is a candi-
date for treatment. The Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria 
Association produces clinical guidelines intended to provide “flexible 
directions for the treatment of persons with gender identity disorders.”69 
The Standards of Care explain that after diagnosis of Gender Identity 
Disorder, the therapeutic approach usually includes three phases:70 real 
life experience in the desired role, hormones of the desired gender, and 
surgery to change genitalia and other sex characteristics.71 The mini-
mum eligibility requirements for genital surgeries apply to genetic men 
and genetic women seeking surgery, and are:
1.  Legal age of majority in the patientʼ’s nation;
2.  Usually 12 months of continuous hormonal therapy for those 
without a medical contraindication;
66 Sex Reassignment Surgery, supra note 56 at 417.
67 Ibid.
68 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 43 at 108.
69 Standards of Care, supra note 14 at 1.
70 The Standards of Care note that clinicians have found that not all persons with GID need or 
want all three phases of therapy. Typically the treatment occurs in the order of hormones, real-
life experience, followed by surgery, but that there are a variety of treatment options of which 
completion of the three phases is only one option. For example, Layden-Stevenson J. noted that 
the real-life experience phase could not be satisfactorily fulfilled in prison.
71 Standards of Care, supra note 14 at 3.
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3.  12 months of successful continuous full time real-life 
experience. Periods of returning to the original gender may 
indicate ambivalence about proceeding and generally should 
not be used to fulfill this criterion;
4.  If required by the mental health professional, regular 
responsible participation in psychotherapy throughout the real-
life experience at a frequency determined jointly by the patient 
and the mental health professional. Psychotherapy per se is not 
an absolute eligibility criterion for surgery; 
5.  Demonstrable knowledge of the cost, required lengths of 
hospitalizations, likely complications, and post surgical 
rehabilitation requirements of various surgical approaches; 
6.  Awareness of different competent surgeons.
Readiness Criteria
1.  Demonstrable progress in consolidating oneʼ’s gender identity;
2.  Demonstrable progress in dealing with work, family, and 
interpersonal issues resulting in a significantly better state of 
mental health; this implies satisfactory control of problems 
such as sociopathy, substance abuse, psychosis, suicidality, for 
instance.72
The diagnostic criteria rely on assumptions that transsexuals are a homo-
geneous group, that the transsexual is sick and needs standardized care, 
and that the transsexual suffers from an illness that subverts social and 
cultural variables.73 In particular, the criterion of real-life experience, 
like passing, is based on how sex roles are imagined in a society and 
the behaviours attributed to either sex. The methods used to allow trans-
sexuals to change from one gender to the other are rigid, prescribed, and 
regularized,74 leaving little room for the challenges to or transgression 
of gender that Butler and Borenstein propose. 
72 Standards of Care, supra note 14 at 20.
73 Anne Bolin, In Search of Eve: Transsexual Rites of Passage (New York: Bergin & Garvey, 
1998) at 53 [In Search of Eve].
74 Ibid. at 6.
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The diagnostic criteria combined with the Standards of Care lead 
to what Billings and Urban describes as “the con.”75 Transsexuals often 
know what it takes to pass, and will put that knowledge to good use. 
In her study of male to female transsexual communities, Anne Bolin 
describes a veritable underground network of information on how to 
“pass”76—both the tests put to a person by their doctor (passing as a 
“real” transsexual) and the tests put to a person by society (passing as a 
“real” woman or man). She points out that the role of the psychiatrist is 
that of gatekeeper, and that the gatekeeper has a certain expectation of 
what it is to be male or female. In her study, she found that as a group, 
male to female transsexuals are highly motivated to score as feminine.77 
Medical and psychiatric communities rely on and reinforce sex-role 
stereotypes and cultural expectations. Transsexuals know this expecta-
tion exists and instead of re-educating they choose to conform to those 
expectations: a manʼ’s view of a “real” woman. Borenstein describes 
how she had her genital surgery because of cultural pressure, and that 
she didnʼ’t fit in a male body so she must have belonged in a female 
body.78 People who are vulnerable in our society cannot risk alienating 
the people who hold the power; thus transsexuals are forced into medi-
cineʼ’s culture of genital imperatives.
V. CONCLUSION
Medically, challenges to the validity of diagnosis and treatment of trans-
sexuals problematize the “cure” of sex reassignment surgery to the point 
that one wonders not only if SRC is ethical but is it safe? Socio-cultural 
critiques of the societal norms upon which Gender Identity Disorder and 
its treatment are based illustrate the harm being done both to transsexu-
als and other vulnerable people in society (particularly women) who 
continue to be marginalized by patriarchal power structures that uphold 
the two-gender system. A feminist approach to ethics calls on women 
to resist and overcome their oppression under patriarchy;79 this is what 
75 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 43 at 108-109.
76 In Search of Eve, supra note 73 at 50-52.
77 In Search of Eve, supra note 73 at 108.
78 Gender Outlaw, supra note 48 at 119.
79 Rosemary Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993) 
at 164 [Feminine and Feminist Ethics].
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80 In Search of Eve, supra note 73 at135.
81 Feminine and Feminist Ethics, supra note 79 at 164.
82 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 43 at 112.
83 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 43 at 112-115.
Raymond is trying to achieve when she supports moralizing transsexu-
alism out of existence. 
The problem with these criticisms is twofold. First, arguing that SRC 
is unethical undermines both the agony of and the choices made by 
transsexuals. Transsexuals experience very real alienation, discomfort, 
and dislike of the sex to which their bodies assign them. Similarly, trans-
sexuals experience very real discrimination, intolerance, violence and 
denial of personal choice and freedoms as a result of their gender and 
gender identity. Deconstructing GID and SRC from this feminist viewpoint 
further marginalizes transsexuals and removes their voice and their right 
to choose. One marginalized group can not reserve the right to speak for 
another; this simply recreates oppressive power structures in another 
form. Perhaps the desire or need for SRC is socially constructed, but sim-
ply deconstructing the desire or need to conclude that SRC is “wrong” 
delegitimizes the choices made by individuals. Bolin points out that 
transsexuals are not participating in a feminist speech revolution—they 
simply want to “pass.”80 Their needs or desires must be respected. It 
is wrong to deny access to SRC based on the moral decision-making of 
those people who already fit into the two-gender system—even if those 
people actually want out of it, and see SRC as one more obstacle to get-
ting out.
The second problem is that feminist ethics should not only criticize 
practices that oppress but also imagine “morally desirable” alternatives 
to them and offer “morally justifiable” ways to resist them.81 Raymond 
and Butlerʼ’s arguments do neither. Billings and Urban look to therapy 
as one answer because transsexuals lack the language “to express the 
disparate and diverse desires which lead them to body mutilation.”82 
Therapy would allow people to step away from the “for” or “against” 
arguments around SRC and allow patients to criticize society and strug-
gle against the crippling effects of social institutions.83
While Billings and Urban present one alternative, their focus is still 
on the transsexual as an object of social change. In supporting the char-
acteristically male aspects of ethics like independence, autonomy and 
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choice, we are subverting the feminine and feminist aspects of commu-
nity, care, and trust. Sex reassignment surgery may not actually heal the 
mind or body, but it serves a moral function:84 SRC allows transsexuals 
to choose the treatment they require as needed and validates their ex-
periences as gender variant. This aspect of SRC is compatible with and 
can coexist with a feminist deconstruction of Gender Identity Disorder 
and the need for SRC. A feminist approach can understand the authentic 
experience of transsexuals today and, at the same time, look towards 
the future and work to eliminate the two-gender system to allow for dif-
ferent choices for future people. Fitting with Weberʼ’s framework, this 
certainly produces the most significant benefit for the most number of 
people.
84 Construction of Transsexualism, supra note 43 at 99.
